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No.
A organizations FOCI concerns are reviewed during the application for and throughout the period the facility security clearance is held. The company's FOCI factors should be documented on the organizations "Certificate Pertaining to Foreign Interests" (SF 328).
An SF 328 be submitted during the initial facility clearance process and when significant changes occur to information previously forwarded.
There are many considerations that are reviewed, such as: the type and sensitivity of information requiring protection; the source, nature and extent of FOCI; compliance with pertinent laws, regulations and contracts; whether there are bilateral and multilateral security and information exchange agreements between governments, and ownership or control by a foreign government.
No.
No.
The TCO is the principal advisor to the organization's Government Security Committee for the protection of controlled unclassified information (CIU), and proprietary technology and data subject to regulatory or contractual control by the US Government.
The FSO serves as the principal advisor to the organization's Government Security Committee concerning the safeguarding of classified information. The FSO's responsibility includes the operational oversight of the company's compliance with National Industrial Security Program requirements.
A board resolution can be implemented when a foreign entity does not own voting stock sufficient to elect directors or is not otherwise entitled to representation to the company's board of directors.
No. DCSA will determine when a company is collocated, and if a company is located within close proximity to its foreign parent or affiliate a Facilities Location Plan (FLP) must be approved by DCSA in advance.
The nominee must be a US citizen, residing in the US, who can exercise management prerogatives in a way that ensures that the foreign owner can be effectively insulated from the company and have personnel security clearance consistent with the level of the facility clearance.
The Government Security Committee ensures the organization maintains policies and procedures necessary to safeguard classified information and CUI and that violations of those policies and procedures are promptly investigated and reported to the appropriate authority when it has been determined that a violation has occurred. The GSC should also ensure that the organization complies with US export control laws and regulations and does not take action contrary to performance on classified contracts.
The Government Security Committee is composed of cleared officers/directors and the Outside Directors who are also directors, and who hold personnel security clearances at the level of the company's facility clearance.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is an interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury to review proposed mergers, acquisitions or takeovers of US persons by foreign interests under section 721 of the Defense Production Act. CFIUS is a voluntary process that affords an opportunity for foreign and US persons and organizations considering entering into a covered transaction to submit the transaction for review by CFIUS to assess the impact of the transaction on US national security. Note that CFIUS and DCSA FOCI reviews are conducted in parallel but separate processes.
Administration separations are usually initiated by commanders because of some misconduct on the part of the Service member. This “misconduct” can range from failing to salute an officer, a positive urinalysis, a lost security clearance, even domestic violence. The process is straightforward, well defined, and often abused in order for commanders to rid themselves of “problem children,” particularly when there isn’t enough evidence to give non-judicial punishment or a court-martial. Military regulations permit a commander to recommend an (early) administrative separation when a Service member commits misconduct. The commander has to provide documentation of the misconduct, e.g. Captain’s mast, reprimands, any negative counseling, positive urinalysis, an allegation of violence, and a recommendation for a discharge characterization: Honorable, General (under honorable conditions), or Other than Honorable (OTH). A service member can only get a Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD) or a Dishonorable Discharge (DD) as the result of a court martial. Once the commander provides you the documentation of intent to separate, you will have the opportunity to respond as to why you should be retained. These documents and your response then go to the separation authority (usually the commanding general) for a separation decision. If the separation authority decides to discharge you, there is a good chance you will be out of the military in less than 10 days.
When your commander processes you for separation, you will be notified by your senior non-commissioned officer or a senior petty officer. The notice will tell you:
First of all, when someone tells you not to worry, you can get your discharge upgraded automatically, or easily, that is simply not true. The process of upgrading your discharge at the military service Discharge Review Board is complicated, time consuming, and most assuredly, not guaranteed. You want to get the best discharge possible right when you leave the military. Why? Because until you get your discharge upgraded, you will suffer multiple prejudices and discriminations in the civilian sector and with government agencies. Your DD214 states your characterization of discharge and the reason for discharge. Potential employers may want to see your DD214, and it is required in USA Jobs. Generally, you will not be able to obtain Veterans Affairs (VA) health care if you have an OTH. You can’t be buried in a national cemetery. You may lose your Montgomery or Post 9-11 education benefits. You may not be able to receive VA disability compensation.
The Military services have determined that only certain service members are afforded an opportunity to appear before an administrative separation board: (a) service members with more than six (6) years of active federal service (on active duty and in the reserves); and, (b) if the commander is recommending that you be discharged with an Other than Honorable characterization.
Absolutely not! Only a court-martial can adjudge a punitive discharge, such as a BCD or a DD.
An Honorable discharge is the best a service member can receive. This characterization tells the world that you served your country and did so successfully. Upon receiving an Honorable discharge, you are eligible to receive all of the post-military and veterans benefits you earned and are eligible.
A General (under honorable conditions) characterization means that you served honorably. You weren’t perfect, though. You might have had military discipline issues, for example: frequently showing up for formation or muster late, or failed alcohol rehabilitation, or you received non-judicial punishment. There is nothing wrong with a General discharge per se, you served honorably. As for benefits, you are eligible to receive all of the post-military and veterans benefits that you earned, including disability compensation from the VA. However, you will lose the ability to use any Post-9/11 GI-Bill benefits you may have earned, and this can amount to a significant sum of money.
An Other than Honorable characterization of service is the most damaging discharge you can receive through the administrative separation process. Regrettably, you will lose your eligibility to receive all post-service military benefits, and all VA benefits but for access to health care for your service-connected injuries, illnesses, and diseases.
The Boards for the Corrections of Military (Army, Air Force, Coast Guard) or Naval (Navy and Marine Corps) Records (BCMR) are the highest level of administrative review within their respective military service. They were created by statute (Title 10 USC § 1552) to “correct an error or remove an injustice.” This broad statement allows the Secretary of a Military Department power to correct anything from changing the spelling of your last name on a DD214 to awarding you a military retirement to giving you recognition for wounds obtained in combat. The Secretary of Defense instructed each of the military services to establish these BCMRs and these boards have been processing these kinds of correction requests for decades.
The Boards would have you believe it is as simple as filling out a DD Form 149 and providing one or two sentences as to why your records need to be corrected. In 99.999% cases this is completely insufficient. You have to apply within three (3) years of the date you first discover the “error or injustice,” with a few exceptions. You have to have exhausted all other remedies, too. So, for example, if you are applying to have your discharge upgraded, you first must have applied to the military service Discharge Review Board, and been denied. If you apply to the BCMR without all the necessary evidence the first time and are denied, you have one year to ask for reconsideration. The good news is that in most cases, the Boards will waive the one-year reconsideration limitation if you can provide “new or material” information that was not available to you at the time of the application, or “for good cause shown.” It is in your best interests to provide as much evidence as you can with your first submission so you can get relief from the error or injustice.
To temper expectations, the various Boards have announced they are taking anywhere from 24 to 56 months to review applications from the time you submit your request. In some cases, where there is a matter of great importance, the Boards will “expedite” the request, but those still take from 9 to 12 months.
After you submit your request for a correction, it will take anywhere from 1 to 2 months for the Boards to acknowledge receipt and assign a docket number. Then, for the next 24 to 48 months your case will languish in a dark room until it is assigned to a caseworker. The case worker will review the file, and do one of the following: (1) reject the application because they don’t understand the question or they do not think they have enough information to continue; (2) request an advisory opinion from other staff elements on a particular point (after receiving the opinion it will be forwarded to you for comment); or, (3) draft a case review for the board members. There are other possibilities, but they are rare occurrences. Once the case synopsis is drafted, it will be assigned a hearing date – usually within 60-days of the completing of the case synopsis.
The actual board hearing consists of a document review by a panel of three volunteer Department employees (GS-15 or SES) assigned to the Washington, DC area. They usually serve as a Board member once or twice a year. Board dates are usually on Tuesday and Thursday. The board room is usually a typical large office with three desks. In the room is a table with anywhere from 75 to 100 cases. The three board members will read each of those cases and vote with a majority vote winning the day. So … think about the process. Three people 75 cases, 8 hours – 7 really with lunch and breaks. That is about 9 cases per hour, or 6 minutes per case. In other words, you need to make sure that your submission is concise and strong so that the board members can see all of your evidence to make a decision that is in your favor.
To be honest: 50-50. There are a lot of subjective factors that go into a decision. Some decisions are easy, like a name change, others less so, like changing your Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) because you remarried and missed the deadline. Board members may never have served in the military. Members could have served during Vietnam, the “Cold War”, during Desert Storm, or since September 11th. They could be Soldiers working for the US Navy. As with all “juries,” members come with personal or professional biases. For example, you could have a board composed of a Vietnam veteran and OEF/OIF veteran, and your issue is related to PTSD. The Vietnam member’s decision could be informed by his experiences in combat in Vietnam, and the OEF/OIF veteran is informed by his experience in Iraq or Afghanistan. Each likely has completely different views of combat and PTSD. One might be a former alcoholic and takes a stand that recovering alcoholics have a higher standard to meet. In other words, you never know who is going to be on your Board and what their personal biases may be.
The U.S. government grants individuals a security clearance when it determines the individual is eligible for access to classified national security information. Classified information is information that has been designated by the government as requiring protection from unauthorized disclosure because its release could harm national security. There are three basic levels: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. There are also various gradations where additional security is required. Security clearances are granted to cleared individuals who are employed by the federal government, contractor companies, or others who provide services to the U.S. government and require access to classified information solely to their duties. To obtain a security clearance, applicants must be a US citizen able to obtain a security clearance, be sponsored by an organization to obtain the security clearance, fill out an Standard Form (SF) 86 (Questionnaire for National Security Positions) and then undergo a rigorous investigation process.
There are three basic levels of security classifications in the United States: confidential, secret, and top secret. These classification levels indicate the sensitivity of the information an individual is authorized to access. A confidential clearance is the lowest level of security clearance, and is held by persons in positions requiring access to personnel files, trade secrets, or the like. A secret classification and clearance is required for positions that require access to sensitive information related to national security, e.g., plans for military operations or intelligence-gathering activities. A top-secret classification is the highest level of security clearance and is required for positions for access to information that is of utmost importance to national security, e.g., nuclear weapon design, intelligence activities, or national security decision making. Additional access controls and limitations are increasingly common to further restrict access to compartmentalized information (CI) or access to information in Special Access Programs (SAPs)."
A clearance cannot be granted merely because an individual wants to have one. An individual must first be employed or offered employment by the government or other organization in a position that requires a clearance.
A Special Access Program is a program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements exceeding those normally required for information at the same classification level. SAPs are established only when the program is required by statute, or upon the finding of exceptional vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information, and if the normal criteria for determining access to information classified at the same level are insufficient. SAPs use the standard levels of classified information: Confidential, Secret and Top Secret. SAPs also require an assigned nickname and/or codeword and identification of any special handling procedures. In simplest terms, a SAP is a classified program with enhanced safeguarding and access requirements.
In order to be considered for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) eligibility, an applicant must first be nominated for an SCI billet, complete a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI), and be approved by the government agency that controls the information. Since SCI encompasses several categories of compartmentalized information, Central Adjudication Facilities (CAFs) grant eligibility for access to SCI, and once this eligibility has been established, a person can be granted a special access authorization for a specific category of information within SCI. SCI access eligibility is divided into 3 sensitivity levels and each has a different investigative requirement: SSBI w/o polygraph (poly); SSBI w/ CI Scope poly; and, SSBI full scope poly.
The CAF is the Consolidated Adjudication Facility which was recently subsumed by the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DSCA). DCSA is the primary agency responsible for adjudicating personnel security clearances.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals is the largest component of the Defense Legal Services Agency. DOHA is comprised primarily of attorneys (Department Counsel), Administrative Judges, and administrative support personnel. It provides hearings and issues decisions in personnel security clearance cases for contractor personnel doing classified work for all DoD components and 28 other Federal Agencies and Departments and it conducts personal appearance hearings and issues decisions in security clearance cases for DoD civilian employees and military personnel. It also settles claims for uniformed service pay and allowances, and claims of transportation carriers for amounts deducted from them for loss or damage, as well as conducts hearings on a myriad of other issues. DOHA Administrative Judges also preside over “Personal Appearances” (similar to hearings) of clearance applicants appealing clearance denials or revocations by other divisions of DOD CAF.
Effective January 14, 2021, and to be implemented no later than September 30, 2022, DOHA will be the final adjudicating authority for all denied security clearances in the DoD. DOHA will no longer only provide advisory opinions to each of the Army, Navy and Air Force Personnel Security Advisory Boards (PSABs) for DoD civilians and Service members. Rather, the due process rights previously granted to only industrial employees (DoD contractors) will be granted to everyone in the DoD. DOHA will now be the final deciding authority on whether all DoD employees retain or have their clearances reinstated.
Generally, as long as cleared individuals remain employed by a cleared contractor or government agency and are reasonably expected to require access to classified information, their personnel security clearance will remain in effect, provided they comply with Periodic Reinvestigation requirements. Currently reinvestigations are required at 5-year intervals for Top Secret clearances, 10-year intervals for Secret clearances, and 15-year intervals for Confidential clearances. As of 2021, DISA has successfully enrolled all DoD Service members, civilians and contractors with a security clearance - about 3.6M in a continuous vetting program, which will ultimately replace these periodic reinvestigations. The goal is that DoD personnel who do not have a security clearance will also be included in this continuous vetting under its trusted workforce, TW2.0 goal.
A clearance is terminated when a person permanently leaves a position for which the clearance was granted. Cleared individuals who no longer require access to classified information, but who remain continuously employed by the same cleared contractor (or government agency) and do not anticipate future access can have their clearances administratively downgraded or withdrawn until such time that they require access again, provided their security clearance investigation has not gone out-of-date. Under such circumstances the clearance can be administratively restored.
Yes. If a person previously had a clearance and the investigation has not gone out-of-date, the clearance can be reinstated by the agency that originally granted the clearance or it can be accepted and reciprocally granted by a different agency, provided there hasn’t been a break-in-service of two years or more. This can be done without the individual submitting a new SF86; however, for clearances involving special access authorizations a new SF86 can be required if there has been a break-in-access of more than 60 days or if a polygraph examination is required. Under certain circumstances a clearance can be reinstated (recertified), if it is not more than 2 years out-of-date and a request for reinvestigation has been initiated.
You must answer all questions on the clearance application form truthfully and completely, but you do not have to volunteer unfavorable information that is not related to any of the questions on the form. Many clearance denials for financial problems, drugs, alcohol, and criminal conduct also involve intentional omission of relevant information and/or providing false information during the clearance process. Often the act of providing false information is more serious than the issues people try to hide. Passage of time is a major mitigating factor for all issues involving misconduct. Willfully providing false information on a clearance application or during a Subject Interview is a serious criminal offense and is very difficult to mitigate because of the recency of the offense. In other words, it is always a good practice to be upfront and honest on your SF86 and disclose all relevant information.
The areas identified in the Security Executive Agent Directives (SEADs 1 through 9) and the Adjudicative Guidelines that result in the most security clearance denials or revocations are those that involve potential foreign influence, drug/alcohol abuse, sexual behavior and financial considerations.
When a case contains significant unmitigated derogatory information, the adjudicator issues a “Letter of Intent” (LOI) to deny a clearance. The LOI is a preliminary, tentative decision and will contain a “ Statement of Reasons” (SOR) detailing the issues that are the basis of the decision. Some agencies issue a Letter of Denial with an SOR, but it is essentially the same as an LOI. The LOI contains instructions on how to request a copy of the investigative file on which the decision to issue the LOI was based. Federal contractor personnel can submit a written rebuttal to the SOR and request a hearing. If the applicant doesn’t submit a rebuttal to the SOR, DoD CAF will deny the clearance. If the applicant rebuts the SOR without a hearing, DOHA sends the applicant a File of Relevant Material (FORM) that will be presented to an Administrative Judge (AJ) for a clearance decision based on the written record. The applicant can submit a written response to the FORM, which will also be presented to the AJ. If the applicant requests a hearing, the applicant (with or without an attorney or personal representative) may present witnesses and other evidence at the hearing. The applicant may also cross-examine witnesses and challenge evidence presented by the DOHA Department Counsel (an attorney representing DoD). The AJ makes a written decision and a copy is sent to the applicant. DOHA then grants or denies the clearance in accordance with the AJ’s decision. If the clearance is denied, the applicant is notified in writing and advised of their right to appeal the decision. It is possible that the DOHA Chief Department Counsel could grant the clearance after reviewing the applicant’s response to the SOR, thus obviating the need to present the case to an AJ. DoD civilian employees and military personnel can submit a written rebuttal to the SOR, but they are not entitled to a hearing. If the applicant doesn’t rebut the SOR, DoD CAF will deny the clearance. If they submit a rebuttal to the SOR, the adjudicator will decide to grant or deny the clearance in light of information submitted in the rebuttal. If a decision is made to deny a clearance, the applicant is notified in writing of their right to appeal the decision, including a right to a “Personal Appearance” before a DOHA AJ.
Polygraphs are instruments that measure physiological responses (respiration, pulse, blood pressure, and galvanic resistance) to stress. Among other purposes polygraphs are used to help determine an individual’s eligibility for a special assignment or access to specifically designated information protected within SAPs. They are not generally used for collateral security clearances, unless they are necessary to resolve serious credible derogatory information that cannot be resolved through conventional investigative means. Polygraph examinations are conducted as a supplement to, not as a substitute for, other forms of investigation that may be required under the circumstances. Polygraph exams are only administered by agencies with approved personnel security polygraph programs and these exams are only conducted by government trained and certified examiners.
Within the context of security clearances, the purpose of a polygraph exam is to assist in determining whether or not an applicant can be trusted with sensitive information. Polygraph screening exams are governed by Security Executive Agent Directive 2 and Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 704.6. The exams are used to determine eligibility for special assignment or special access and are limited to two types of polygraph exams, and either one or both exams may be administered. A Counterintelligence Polygraph is the most common type of polygraph exam. A Counterintelligence Polygraph asks the candidate questions limited to those necessary to determine whether the examinee ever had any involvement with or knowledge of: Espionage, Sabotage, Terrorist Activities, Deliberate damage of U.S. Government Information Systems Intentional compromise of U.S. Government Classified Information, Secret contact with a foreign national or representative, Unauthorized disclosure or removal of classified information, etc. A Lifestyle Polygraph asks the candidate questions concerning their personal life and conduct A Lifestyle Polygraph can also attempt to look for issues in a person’s private life for which they might be susceptible to blackmail or coercion. DoD Lifestyle Polygraph exam questions cover the following topics: Involvement in a serious crime, Personal involvement with illegal drugs during the last seven years, Deliberate falsification of the security forms, etc. A Full Scope Polygraph exam is a combination of both the Counterintelligence and Lifestyle polygraphs. Full Scope Polygraph exams are also known as Expanded Scope Polygraph exams.
As of 2016, federal agencies were authorized to and do now collect, use, and retain publicly available social media information for Personnel Security Background Investigations and Adjudications. Subsequent to recent well-publicized events, DoD has been taking a more aggressive approach to monitoring social media posts by Service members, perhaps flagging "inappropriate" social media content similar to flags for financial trouble, criminal arrests or drug/alcohol problems.
A facility clearance is a security clearance granted to a U.S. government contractor or subcontractor facility that is engaged in work requiring access to classified information. This clearance is granted by the government agency responsible for the contract and is based on a determination that the facility is eligible to access classified information. A facility clearance is necessary for the facility to bid on and perform work on classified government contracts. It involves a comprehensive evaluation of the facility's security practices, personnel, and physical security measures to ensure that it can adequately safeguard classified information. The clearance process includes a background check of key personnel and a review of the facility's security procedures and practices. Facility clearances are typically granted at one of three levels: Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. The level of clearance required depends on the level of classification of the information that the facility will access and the sensitivity of the contract work. Once a facility clearance is granted, the facility is required to maintain ongoing security practices and procedures to ensure the continued protection of classified information. This includes regular security assessments and audits by government security officials. Overall, facility clearances are an important aspect of the U.S. government's efforts to protect classified information and ensure the security of government contracts.
The DCSA issues Facility Clearances.
If a contractor's employees require access to classified information to perform their duties, the contract company must have an facility clearance and its employees must have a personnel security clearances, and the a facility clearance must be issued before any classified material can be provided to the contractor.
The Government is responsible for paying for personnel security and facility clearances. There is no cost to the contract company.
A classified contract requires contract employees to have access to classified information and are required to have personnel security clearances. The actual solicitation is not usually classified and contains the usual documentation.
It is possible for a contract company without a facility clearance to be awarded a classified contract . However, this could affect the timeline for contract performance and therefore the ability of the government to meet its mission needs. But, if the government selects an uncleared contractor the actual contract will not be awarded until the facility clearance is issued. Again, this is rare, but possible.
No. There is no process to increase the likelihood of the successful offeror being issued a facility clearance.
No.
There are three main components. FIRST, the organization's key management personnel, as identified by DCSA, must be eligible for and be issued personnel security clearances. SECOND, the organization's main corporate "office" must always be cleared. Its U.S. parent organization's must also be cleared or formally excluded from access to classified information. THIRD, the organization must adopt resolutions to mitigate foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI) (see below).
Foreign companies, e.g., companies wholly owned by non-US citizens and organized in other countries, e.g., Germany, Morocco, Japan, etc., cannot be issued facility clearances. However, foreign-owned U.S. companies can be issued a facility clearance, but it is contingent on the country from which the foreign ownership is derived and whether the FOCI can be mitigated (see below).
No. Only when the contract requires the storage of classified information, with the organization be required to store classified information at its organizational locations.
All cleared organizations must designate an individual as the Facility Security Officer (FSO) and Insider Threat Program Senior Official (ITPSO). The FSO and ITPSO are key management personnel. The FSO is responsible for all security matters. The FSO's responsibilities include, among others: submission of security clearances packages for contractor personnel, briefing and debriefing of cleared employees, acting as the liaison with the organization's DCSA Industrial Security (IS) Representative.
The contract must contain a bona fide contract requirement for access to classified information for another cleared organization to request or sponsor a facility clearance for a vendor.
Yes, a prime contractor may sponsor an uncleared subcontractor for an facility clearance only if they demonstrate to DCSA a bona fide requirement for the subcontractor to perform as a subcontractor.
No. DCSA does not normally process a facility clearance for a one-person company.
No.
Yes. If a joint venture is awarded a classified contract, the joint venture itself must be processed for a facility clearance. Furthermore, DCSA will make a JV key personnel determination based on the joint venture agreement. There are additional considerations based on the unique circumstances of the award and the joint ventures.
Foreign ownership, influence, and control (FOCI) in the national security setting refers to situations where a foreign organization, government or person has a significant ownership interest in the organization and the ability to influence decisions or contractual relationships with a U.S. company. An organization with FOCI concerns may create a security risk that could compromise U.S. national security, e.g., a Chinese company may gain access to For sensitive technologies or information that could be used to gain a competitive advantage or engage in activities that comprise the United States' national security interests. The government has laws and regulations to review and regulate foreign investment in U.S. companies and assets critical to national security. One government organization that reviews these issues is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) which reviews foreign investment to determine whether such investment could harm national security. FOCI issues are normally addressed through contract provisions, such as restrictions on the transfer of sensitive information or technology to foreign entities.
An organization may have FOCI issues when foreign-owned organizations, individuals or governments have an interest in or the direct or indirect power -- whether or not it is exercised, to direct or decide matters that affect the management or operations of the organization in such a manner so as to result in unauthorized access to classified information or adversely affect contract performance.
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